I. INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship between the First Amendment right to expressive association and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote? It's closer than you probably think. The Supreme Court employs a balancing test in constitutional challenges to a wide variety of election practices, including ballot access rules, blanket primaries, and voter identification. This standard is commonly referred to as "Anderson-Burdick" for the two main cases from which it derives, Anderson v. Celebrezze 1 and Burdick v. Takushi. 2 Recent lower court decisions have applied this test in constitutional challenges to state laws restricting same day registration, 3 provisional voting, 4 and early voting.
5
The Anderson-Burdick standard is the offspring of a union between the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote and the First Amendment right of association. 6 This Article explores the origins, development, and subsequent obscuration of the relationship between these two rights. It argues for a renewed recognition of the voting-association link when it comes to the burdens on voting challenged in the current generation of voting rights litigation.
Central to this story are two opinions by Justice John Paul Stevens, one written early in his tenure on the Supreme Court and the other near the end. The first opinion is Anderson, a challenge to ballot access restrictions that were used to exclude independent candidate John Anderson from Ohio's 1980 presidential ballot. Anderson
Reviving the voting-association link would cast recent election administration cases, including Crawford and its lower-court progeny, in a different light-one that more accurately reflects the realworld dynamic in these cases. Disputes over voting rules are not simply or even mainly about an individual's right to cast a ballot without impediment. They are better understood as inter-party disputes, in which political insiders seek to block political outsiders from aggregating their votes so as to challenge the dominant group. Like the seminal First Amendment association cases of the McCarthy and civil rights eras, recent voting controversies center on the risk that those in power will suppress groups challenging that power-be it the Communist Party in the 1950s, the NAACP in the 1960s, independent-minded voters in 1980, or Democrats in Texas today. Viewing the right of association as a component of the right to vote allows us to understand the constitutional problems inherent when political insiders manipulate election rules to stymie those collectively seeking to challenge their power.
This Article is not the first to suggest a link between the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. Abner Greene, 13 Lori Ringhand, 14 and Janai Nelson 15 are among those who have written on the subject, as have I. 16 But most previous scholarship on the subject focuses on free speech rather than association. The leading exception is Guy Charles who thoroughly explored the relationship between voting and associational rights in a 2003 article. 17 My account differs from his in two respects. First, Professor Charles understood the Anderson line of cases as resting on the First Amendment right of association instead of the Equal Protection Clause. I view equal protection and association as mutually reinforcing. Second, Professor Charles emphasized racial association, while this Article sees political parties as the central association in contemporary politics and the constitutional law of elections. 18 What are the implications of recognizing that voting is a form of association protected by the First Amendment? Reconnecting voting and association would reframe the central issue in future constitutional litigation. It would thus lead to a sharpened understanding of 13 . See ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE the injury that the now ubiquitous Anderson-Burdick standard is designed to prevent. The State would have a heavier burden of justification to the extent that election rules have the effect of discriminating against voters supporting the opposing party. Associational rights provide an appropriate vehicle for understanding voting injuries, including not only ballot access and blanket primary issues to which the First Amendment has traditionally been deployed, but also election administration controversies to which it has not. Future litigants challenging burdens on voting should therefore add the First Amendment association claims to their arsenal. Doing so would hone in on the real injury in the current generation of voter ID, early voting, provisional voting, and voter registration cases: preventing nondominant political parties and their supporters from challenging the party in power.
Part II of this Article traces the roots of the First Amendment right to expressive association, starting with the mid-century cases involving the NAACP and Communist Party and proceeding through later decisions involving compelled association and campaign finance regulation. Part III examines the relationship between voting and the associational rights through a close analysis of cases connecting these two rights, as well as more recent cases that overlook this connection. Part IV proposes the re-linking of voting and associational rights, arguing for a refinement of the Anderson-Burdick doctrine to focus on the disparate impact on non-dominant parties, and tracing how this refinement would play out in constitutional challenges to present-day voting restrictions.
II. THE ROOTS OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
One of the leading statements of the core value underlying the First Amendment appears in Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion for the Court in Police Department v. Mosley.
19 "[A]bove all else," he wrote, "the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 20 The Court has reiterated this admonition many times, doubling down on it in recent First Amendment cases.
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As Justice Scalia put it in one of his last dissents: " [T] Amendment is a kind of Equal Protection Clause for ideas."
22 It guards against government officials misusing their power to suppress points of view they disfavor. Most conspicuously, it prevents the dominant political group from trying to silence dissident groups that threaten its grip on power.
This conception of the First Amendment finds its most fulsome expression in the decisions in which the Supreme Court developed the right of association. From its beginnings, the main beneficiaries of this right have been groups advancing a political viewpoint contrary to that espoused by the powers-that-be. 23 The Supreme Court developed the First Amendment right of association in a series of midcentury cases, most of them arising from governmental interference with two types of groups.
One line of cases involves the NAACP and other groups advocating for civil rights in the South. The first and most important of these decisions was NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. 24 An Alabama court had cited the NAACP for contempt after it refused to comply with an order that the group disclose its members in accordance with state law. 25 In holding that the NAACP had a First Amendment right to resist disclosure, Justice Harlan wrote for the Court:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.
26
Compelled disclosure of the NAACP's members, the Court concluded, would paralyze its attempt to advocate for racial justice. This was an entirely realistic appraisal at the time, when threats and 30 the Court reversed a conviction of a party member whose specific intent to further illegal activities had not been proven. The upshot was that mere association with a political party, despite its illegal aims, was insufficient to convict. Later cases expanded this protection beyond criminal cases, prohibiting the denial of other benefits such as employment 31 or bar membership 32 based on party membership alone. These cases thus prevent the government from imposing either criminal penalties or other sanctions based on one's dissident political views absent evidence of an intent to promote illegal activity. The chief concern is that government-targeting of unpopular groups would discourage people from joining, thus impoverishing public debate.
Other cases extend protection to people associating as a way to advance their political beliefs through litigation. In this area, too, the groundbreaking case arose from the civil rights movement. In NAACP v. Button, 33 the Court struck down a Virginia law prohibiting lawyers from soliciting prospective clients, which had been used to stop the NAACP's efforts to organize civil rights lawsuits. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court held that the litigation, in which the NAACP sought to engage, was not just a means of resolving private 27 disputes but also "a form of political expression." 34 While recognizing that the NAACP was "not a conventional political party," its litigation sought to advance the collective interests of the African American community. 35 Virginia's law thus infringed upon the associational rights of the NAACP, as well as its members and its lawyers. Later cases extended this protection to other groups engaged in impact litigation such as labor unions 36 and advocates for reproductive rights.
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The unifying theme is that the State may not prevent people from associating in pursuit of ideological goals through litigation. The freedom to associate in pursuit of shared political goals sometimes includes the freedom not to associate as well. An example is Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, in which the Court held that public employees could not be compelled to support a labor union's ideological activities, though they could be required to pay for the union's collective bargaining services. 38 The First Amendment's protection against compelled association is not, however, absolute. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 39 the Court held that the First Amendment's protections did not extend to a private club's exclusion of women, which was a violation of a state civil rights statute, because the admission of women would do no discernible damage to the club's expressive aims. 40 On the other hand, the Court struck down the application of a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. 41 The Court accepted the Boy Scouts' claim that accepting gays would undermine its antigay message and, accordingly, infringe on its right to expressive association. 42 The right to be free from compelled association thus extends only to those whose participation would interfere with the group's message. 43 As with other cases involving associational rights, the central question in the compelled association cases is whether state action has impeded a group's ability to express its ideological perspective.
Similar concerns are at play in cases involving campaign finance regulation, an area worthy of special note given its close connection to voting. Two aspects of campaign finance law implicate expressive association. The first is restrictions on political contributions, which Buckley v. Valeo 44 famously distinguished from restrictions on expenditures. While restrictions on the latter directly impede political speech, the Court reasoned, contribution limits are only a "marginal" restriction on speech. 45 Buckley viewed contribution limits as mainly affecting association, rather than speech, 46 and thus warranting less searching scrutiny than expenditure limits. 47 The other aspect of campaign finance law implicating associational rights is compelled disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures. Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has recognized that mandatory disclosure has the potential to chill would-be donors and spenders, subjecting such requirements to "exacting scrutiny."
48 While generally upholding disclosure requirements, 49 the Court has recognized the need to accommodate groups and individuals that may suffer retaliation if contributions are made public. 50 Accordingly, it has held that individuals and groups may claim an exception where there is a "reasonable probability" that compelled disclosure will lead to threats, harassment, or reprisals. 51 mainstream political groups, whose fundraising and therefore expression may be stymied if their supporters' identities are publicized.
Thus far, I have focused on cases that involve political association but do not directly concern the act of voting. There is, however, another line of cases in which the Court has extended the right of expressive association to voters, candidates, and parties joining together at the ballot box. Part III discusses those cases.
III. ASSOCIATION AND THE VOTE
The Supreme Court has long flirted with the idea that voting is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment, but has never adopted this position. It has, however, held that voting is a form of expressive association protected by the First Amendment.
Before exploring the connection between voting and association, it is worth considering the road not taken. The Court entertained the argument that voting was protected speech in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 52 but wound up striking down the poll tax based solely on the fundamental right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment.
53 Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Harper observed that "[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process."
54 By denying the vote to citizens unable to pay the $1.50 poll tax, Virginia was effectively discriminating against poor people in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Harper plaintiffs argued that voting is speech protected by the First Amendment, but the Court declined to rule on that ground. 55 Nor has it since then, though some Justices have occasionally toyed with the possibility. 56 The Court's closest brush with the idea since then was Bush v. Gore. 57 on schemes given to government officials to regulate speech, 58 but ultimately rested-at least explicitly-on the right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause.
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While not viewing voting as speech, the Court has, for decades, held that some aspects of voting are protected forms of association under the First Amendment. The first case to recognize the votingassociation link was Williams v. Rhodes, 60 decided two years after Harper. Williams involved a challenge to Ohio's requirement that new political parties file petition signatures, equal to fifteen percent of the ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election, by February in order to get on the presidential ballot. 61 This restriction was challenged by the American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party.
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In striking down Ohio's restrictions, Justice Black's opinion for the Court relied on both the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment. The Court cited the NAACP and Communist Party decisions on freedom of association, extending their principle to state laws restricting political parties' access to the ballot. 63 The problem, according to the opinion, was that the law advantaged political insiders over outsiders, "giv[ing] the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new parties . . . and thus plac[ing] substantially unequal burdens on both the right to vote and the right to associate." 64 The Court thus required the State to provide a compelling interest justifying its restriction and then proceeded to reject the State's proffered justifications. 65 Most significantly, it rejected the stated interest in favoring a two-party system on the ground that Ohio's law went further, "favor[ing] two particular parties-the Republicans and the Democrats-and in effect tends to give them a complete monopoly."
66 Without a sufficient interest to justify the law, Ohio's ballot access restriction was held to impose an impermissible burden on voting and associational rights. Williams was an important step forward in two respects. First, it explicitly recognized the link between the First Amendment right of expressive association and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. Second, Williams involved a positive claim to get something from the government, rather than a negative claim to be left alone. Most earlier cases involved the State's unwanted government intrusion on the affected group's liberty interest-for example, the government seeking a membership list in NAACP v. Alabama or restricting solicitation of clients in NAACP v. Button. By contrast, the Williams plaintiffs were demanding something from the State: a place on the ballot. That said, Williams is not as much of an extension of precedent as it might first appear. Some of the Communist Party cases likewise involved an affirmative claim to something from the government-a job or, later, admission to the bar-that was denied on account of party affiliation. There is still a difference, however, in that these benefits were expressly denied on account of belief or association in the earlier cases. By contrast, Williams relied on the practical effect of the State's restrictions on non-dominant political parties and their supporters.
Subsequent cases follow Williams in affirming the link between voting and association, while qualifying both rights. The Court would go on to uphold some restrictions on third party and independent candidates' access to the ballot, such as reasonable signature and disaffiliation requirements. 68 In other cases, it invalidated rules that imposed too great a burden on would-be voters or candidates, especially those seeking to challenge the two major parties' grip on power. 69 For example, in Kusper v. Pontikes, the Court struck down a requirement that voters be disaffiliated from one party for at least twenty-three months before voting in the primary of another, finding it too great a restriction on voters associating with the party of their choice. 70 Some of these cases emphasize equal protection, others freedom of association, but none of them question the link between these rights that Williams recognized.
A critical development in the law of voting and association was Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Anderson, another challenge to Ohio ballot access rules. A state statute required that independent presidential candidates file papers in late March, seventy-five days before the primary election and more than seven months before the general election. 71 The plaintiffs were John Anderson, an independent candidate for President in 1980, and three voters supporting his candidacy. 72 Justice Stevens' opinion in Anderson solidifies and develops the link between voting and association. Because "a candidate serves as a rallying-point for like-minded citizens," Justice Stevens wrote, restrictions on ballot access may hinder voters' freedom to associate with both candidates of their choice and one another. 73 The risk is particularly great where dominant parties make rules that exclude independent or minor party candidates. That does not mean that all state restrictions on ballot access are invalid. The Court reconciled Williams' requirement of a compelling interest with the more lenient standard suggested in later decisions, by articulating a balancing test. As a practical matter, Justice Stevens' opinion recognized that states must impose some regulations on elections. There is accordingly no "litmus-paper test" for separating valid and invalid ones. 74 Courts should instead weigh the "character and magnitude" of the harm to First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the "precise interest put forward by the State."
75 While "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" are generally justified by the State's "important regulatory interests," stronger government interests are required to justify more serious burdens, including ones that are discriminatory.
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Anderson's standard focuses mainly on the impact that the challenged practice has on voters favoring independent or non-dominant party candidates. At the center of the inquiry is the effect of the challenged practice on those likely to favor political outsiders. The Court emphasized that it is not just the "magnitude" or the burden but also its "character" 77 -or, as stated at the end of the opinion, not just the "extent" of the burden but also its "nature"-that is critical. 78 Especially problematic are burdens that "fall[] unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates," because they "discriminate[] against those candidates and-of particular importanceagainst those voters whose political preferences lie outside the existing political parties."
79 This framing puts the challenged practice's disparate impact on certain groups at the center of the analysis. Anderson does not require proof of a discriminatory purpose, though such evidence would presumably be relevant in illuminating the character of the burden on voting.
Applying its newly formulated standard, the Court concluded that Ohio's early filing deadline had a "substantial impact" on the associational rights of independent-minded voters.
80 By requiring independent candidates to file two and one-half months before the state primary, it would bar those driven to enter the fray by developments occurring during the parties' nomination process. It therefore threatened to deny an adequate choice to voters disaffected by and dissatisfied with the choices offered by the major parties. 81 The Anderson Court proceeded to find the State's interests inadequate to justify this burden. Especially significant is its discussion of Ohio's asserted interest in promoting political stability. The Court rejected the idea that the "desire to protect existing political parties from competition" could justify restrictions on independent and minor-party candidates' ballot access. 82 Protecting the major parties from competition was not an acceptable reason for "the virtual exclusion of other political aspirants from the political arena." 83 Ohio's rule was especially burdensome, the Court recognized, because independent and minor-party candidates often start as a "dissident group" attempting to exert influence within a major party. 84 To exclude them from the general election ballot through an extremely early filing deadline would deny such dissident groups any meaningful leverage.
In addition to providing a legal standard, access. 85 And in the concluding paragraph of its opinion, the Court stressed that its "primary concern was not the interest of candidate Anderson, but rather, the interests of the voters who chose to associate
In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases, applying the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection analysis, have identified the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights implicated by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and candidates, and have considered the degree to which the State's restrictions further legitimate state interests. Here and elsewhere in the opinion, the Court expressly states it is relying on both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 88 Declining to engage in a "separate" equal protection analysis is not the same as rejecting the Equal Protection Clause as a source of the hybrid right it recognized. To the contrary, the Court elsewhere affirms that ballot access rules may affect both voting and associational rights. Anderson synthesizes associational and voting rights, rather than replacing the former with the latter. 89 Justice White's opinion for the majority unambiguously reaffirmed Anderson's "flexible" standard, reiterating that courts should weigh the "character and magnitude" of the challenged restriction against the "precise interests put forward by the State." 90 It also quotes Anderson's statement that "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" may generally be supported by "the State's important regulatory interests." 91 Burdick's main doctrinal contribution is to clarify that only a restriction that is "severe" should receive strict scrutiny, requiring government to show it is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. 92 Finding the State's prohibition on write-in voting to be "slight" in magnitude and "politically neutral" in character, Burdick held that the State's interests in preventing factionalism and party raiding were sufficient to sustain it. 93 state interests adequate to justify that burden. 98 Yet they apply the same basic framework that the Court adopted in Anderson, reaffirming its fusion of voting and association claims.
The Court would later extend Anderson's reasoning to disputes between the major parties. The first and still most important case to do so was Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.
99 Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court struck down Connecticut's prohibition on independent voters participating in primaries as applied to the state Republican Party, which had adopted a rule allowing independent voters to participate in its primary. At the time, Democrats controlled the state legislature and, in a party-line vote, refused to change state law to accommodate Republicans' desire to include independents in their primary. Applying the Anderson standard, the Court concluded that the State had imposed an impermissible burden on association.
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Like the minor-party and independent-candidate decisions on which it builds, Tashjian reflects a concern with a dominant party seeking to diminish the strength of a rival group.
101 Professor Lowenstein has criticized Tashjian, partly on the ground that "the major parties are grown-ups who, generally speaking, can be expected to take care of themselves."
102 This may sometimes be true-but not always. After all, the dominant major party is more likely to have its grip on power threatened by the other major party than by minor 98 . Munro defers to the State's interests in avoiding voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, and frivolous candidacies. Timmons adds the interest in promoting "political stability" to the list of those that may justify ballot access restrictions. My two casebook co-authors, Rick Hasen 103 But there is also good reason for judicial skepticism, where one major party controls the machinery of government and uses that power to make life difficult for its main competitor.
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To recap, the Anderson-Burdick standard has been applied in a wide variety of electoral contexts, including state laws regulating ballot access, restricting write-in voting, and determining who may vote in party primaries. These cases affirm, explicitly or implicitly, the link between voting and association recognized in Williams and developed in Anderson. For the most part, the cases in which the Court has found a violation are ones in which a dominant major party uses its power to impede association among voters favoring the other major party, minor parties, or independent candidates.
The most recent doctrinal development involves a subject that, at first glance, seems quite dissimilar to the voting-association cases detailed above: voter identification. (2000), striking down a state blanket primary in which non-party members were allowed to vote in a party primary over the major parties' objections. In contrast to Tashjian, this was not a case in which the dominant major party was frustrating voting and association rights of its main competitor. 106 It proceeds to apply the constitutional standard of Anderson and its progeny, balancing the burden placed on voting against the precise interest put forward by the State. 107 According to Justice Stevens, the number of affected voters was "small" and the "magnitude of the burden" uncertain on the record before the Court. 108 Although the plaintiffs asserted that Indiana's law would have a negative effect on indigent voters, evidence of an excessive burden on them or any other identifiable class of voters was lacking.
109 Given the modest burden on voters, the State's claimed interests in fraud prevention, voter confidence, and election modernization were sufficient to sustain the statute against a facial challenge.
Under Anderson and the voting-as-association cases that followed, the central question is the impact of the challenged law on supporters of a non-dominant party or candidate. Crawford's discussion of this point is telling. Justice Stevens' lead opinion observed that Indiana's law was approved on a party-line vote, with Republicans uniformly supporting it and Democrats uniformly opposing it. 110 From this fact, it could fairly be inferred that partisan considerations played a role in its passage. But the existence of such motivations-invariably present in any law regulating elections-was insufficient to invalidate the law on its face. on voters favoring non-dominant parties or independent candidacies. It is also consistent with Justice Stevens' view in partisan gerrymandering cases, in which he has advocated attention to "whether the plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group."
112 The Crawford record was conspicuously devoid of evidence that Indiana's law would have a disproportionate impact on Democrats compared to Republicans. 113 The lead opinion suggests that this omission was a serious one, undercutting the suggestion that Indiana's law was discriminatory and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Justice Scalia's concurrence (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito) purported to apply Anderson and Burdick, but read those cases differently. He urged a "two-track approach," applying strict scrutiny in cases where there is a severe burden and deferring to the states in other cases. 114 As Justin Levitt has explained, Justice Scalia's approach is more like a light switch, while that of the other Justices is more like a dimmer with the State's burden of justification increasing with the burden on voters.
115 Unlike the lead opinion-as well as the dissents-Justice Scalia would avoid any judicial inquiry into the "individual impacts" on voters.
116 While this statement might be understood to imply that collective impacts are relevant, it appears that this group would find a severe burden only in cases where discriminatory intent to disadvantage a particular group is proven.
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Justice Souter's dissent (joined by Justice Ginsburg) applies the same standard as Justice Stevens, balancing the "character and magnitude" of the burden on voting against the "precise interests put forward by the state."
118 But Justice Souter found the burden on voters to be more substantial than the majority, focusing especially on voter IDs' effects on indigent voters. 119 Justice Breyer's dissent applied a similar balancing standard, without expressly relying on Anderson and Burdick, focusing on the law's impact on voters who are poor, elderly, or disabled.
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Despite the absence of a majority opinion, a majority of Justices in Crawford agreed on two key points. The first is that the constitutional standard drawn from Anderson and Burdick applies in challenges to voter ID laws, and presumably other barriers to voting. At least eight and possibly all nine Justices agree on this point. 121 Second, a majority of Justices (those joining the lead opinion and dissents) agree that courts should balance the character and magnitude of the burden on voters against the precise interests put forward by the State.
122 For these Justices, the impact of the law on a definable group of voters is germane to defining its character. Because the Crawford plaintiffs focused on voter ID's impact on poor people, that is the group on which the Justices' opinions primarily focus. Yet these opinions leave open the possibility-and the lead opinion strongly suggests-that the impact on adherents of a non-dominant political party might also be relevant.
There is a major difference between Crawford and previous cases I have discussed. Unlike the precedents upon which it relies, Crawford was based solely on the right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause, not the right of association under the First Amendment. Constitutional cases concerning voting barriers since Crawford have likewise been litigated and decided primarily if not exclusively as right-to-vote cases. Examples include two cases from Ohio decided during the 2012 election season. The first case, Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted, 123 challenged a state rule requiring the rejection of provisional ballots cast in the correct polling place but the wrong precinct-often referred to as "right church, wrong pew" ballots-due to poll worker error. Plaintiffs sought relief under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction requiring that these ballots be counted, focusing its analysis on the burden Ohio's rule imposed on voters who are not directed to the 119. Id. at 212, 220. 120. Id. at 237-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 121. Justice Breyer may not be in agreement; however, he seems to apply the Anderson-Burdick standard without expressly citing those cases.
122. That majority includes the three Justices signing on to the lead opinion (Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy) along with the three dissenters (Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181-83.
123. 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's preliminary injunction as to provisional ballots with a deficient affirmation. 129 That case, however, is unusual. The general rule has been for plaintiffs to ground their claims exclusively on the right to vote and not the right of association-despite the Supreme Court's recognition that voting is association protected by the First Amendment.
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In summary, the Court has long recognized the linkage between the right to expressive association and the right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It first recognized that linkage in cases involving minor party and independent candidates' access to the ballot, later extending it to cases in which the dominant major party imposes burdens on the other major party.
Anderson developed a balancing test for voting-association cases, subsequently refined in Burdick. In Crawford and subsequent lower court cases, however, the connection between the right to vote and the right to expressive association was severed. Constitutional challenges to burdens on voting have mostly been litigated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the First Amendment right of association. The consequence has been to shift the focus away from the challenged laws' effects on different subgroups of voters, particularly those defined by party affiliation. Part IV argues for recovery of the voting-association link.
IV. RECONNECTING VOTING AND ASSOCIATION
Litigants and courts should rekindle the relationship between the constitutional rights of voting and association. Voting rights lawyers should allege violations of the First Amendment right of association in cases challenging burdens on voting such as ID requirements, restrictions on voter registration, and limitations on early voting. Courts entertaining these cases should focus on the disparate effect of these practices on different political groups. While disparate effects on racial groups, people with disabilities, and economic status are important, political party association is especially important. Accordingly, voting rights lawyers should present proof of a disparate impact on voters inclined to support the non-dominant party, and courts should consider this evidence in determining whether a given burden is "discriminatory" in character, thus demanding a higher burden of justification from the State.
To be clear, I am not arguing for abandonment of the votingassociation doctrine recognized in Williams, defined in Anderson, clarified in Burdick, and applied to voting burdens in Crawford. I am instead calling for refinement of that doctrine. The Anderson-Burdick balancing test effectively captures the need for courts to focus on not only the "magnitude" of the restriction, but also its "character." While magnitude includes both the number of voters affected and the degree of burden on the individual voter, the character of the burden includes its discriminatory impact on particular subgroups of voters. It also captures the necessity of scrutinizing the specific interests proffered by the State in support of its restrictions, with stronger interests required to justify greater burdens.
The major problem with the Anderson-Burdick standard, as applied in voting cases since Crawford, is that it's unclear exactly what the inquiry into the "character" of the burden should entail. Anderson explicitly made discrimination relevant to the inquiry, but lower courts have struggled to figure out what kind of discriminationspecifically, discrimination against whom-is most significant. Dif-ferent plaintiffs and judges have considered the impact on various groups of voters, including poor people, racial minorities, homeless people, people with disabilities, and elderly voters. In contrast to the voting-association cases from which the Anderson-Burdick standard derives, post-Crawford courts have not looked directly at the challenged practice's partisan impact.
The primary cost of forgetting the link between voting and association has been to lose focus on political parties. That focus was central to the line of decisions from which the Anderson-Burdick standard emerged. Why should political party be relevant in measuring the character of a voting restriction? The simple answer is that parties are the primary means through which democratic politics is organized, a reality long recognized by the voting-association cases in the Anderson line. What these cases have in common is the dominant party's adoption of rules that disadvantage voters supporting a nondominant party or faction. Elected officials at the federal and state level almost always come to office through the nomination of their political party. Most voters register and vote as members of a party, while even independent voters tend to align with one major party or the other on a consistent basis. 131 Party identity has become increasingly intense in the current age of hyperpolarized politics, not only among elected officials but also among voters.
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To be sure, political parties are amorphous and multifarious entities, as political scientists have long understood. Over a half-century ago, V.O. Key characterized parties as comprising three distinct groups: the party-in-government, the party leadership, and the partyin-the-electorate. 133 Contemporary scholarship recognizes that it is even more complicated than that. A recent article by Joey Fishkin and Heather Gerken sums it up nicely: "[A] party today is best understood as a loose coalition of diverse entities, some official and some not, organized around a popular national brand."
134 Now more than ever, the major political parties are complex and fluid entities with lots of moving parts. Recognition of this reality does nothing to diminish the centrality of parties in organizing democratic politics and defining our political identities as citizens, voters, candidates, and officeholders. While party leadership may be weak, party attachment is stronger than ever. 135 Putting political parties at the center of the constitutional inquiry is therefore justified under both precedent and present-day reality. Equally important, a focus on political parties would also best capture the injury that underlies plaintiffs' claims. The primary reason for concern with present-day restrictions on voting is that they are thinly disguised efforts at partisan manipulation, designed to help the dominant major party at the expense of its main competitor.
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This is true not only of voter ID laws, but also restrictions on voter registration, early voting, and provisional voting that have since emerged as major issues. As the district judge in Crawford aptly put it, "[T]his is a partisan controversy that has spilled into the courts." That is an accurate description of Crawford and many of the lower court cases since then. The lesson is not that courts should shy away from deciding such cases, but that they should directly address the partisan effects of the challenged practices. Their failure to do so is a direct consequence of forgetting the link between voting and associational rights.
For scholars and students of election law, the suggestion that constitutional litigation should be viewed through the prism of interparty struggles may seem painfully obvious. The backdrop against which this litigation occurs, after all, is almost always a state's dominant party enacting rules that make it more difficult for supporters of the opposing party to vote. Advocates of a "structural" approach to elections have long focused on barriers to fair competition, 137 while advocates of rights-based approaches also recognize the need for close judicial scrutiny of party-based discrimination. 138 now. Litigants and courts have not focused directly on partisan disparate impact. Recognition of the associational rights implicated by voting cases would allow courts to focus on the real harm, the dominant political party disadvantaging supporters of its main rival.
My colleague Ned Foley has made a similar point, arguing that the constitutional inquiry should focus on whether voting rules are efforts at partisan manipulation. 139 But Professor Foley suggests that the Anderson-Burdick balancing be jettisoned entirely, favoring an approach that would expressly look to whether the challenged practice is "a ploy to achieve partisan advantage." 140 I agree with his recognition of the underlying problem, though not with his proposed elimination of the established constitutional standard. Professor Foley's new test suggests that courts focus on legislature's partisan intent, while the clarification of the Anderson-Burdick I recommend would focus on partisan impact. My approach is more consistent with precedent, specifically the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford line of cases, which focus on effect rather than an intent to disadvantage political parties, while avoiding the difficulties that inevitably accompany intent-or purpose-based inquiries.
141 It is also more practical. After all, partisan considerations are always-without exception-in play when political actors adopt a voting rule. Deciding how much of partisan purpose is too much is an impossible question. Perhaps most significant, Professor Foley's proposed standard would put courts in the uncomfortable position of having to accuse the dominant party of partisan manipulation to find a constitutional violation. Judges may occasionally be willing to go out on this limb, 142 but it is neither reasonable nor conducive to healthy inter-branch relations to require that they do so, even if it were a manageable inquiry.
An effects-based balancing standard, moreover, is better calibrated to address the competing interests that are almost invariably in play in cases involving burdens on the vote. On one side are the negative effects that a given practice will have on voters favoring a nondominant party. The greater the disparate impact on voters affiliated with the non-dominant party, the stronger the State's justification should be. A refined version of the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford standard-one that puts partisan effects at the center of the analysis-is not only faithful to the voting-association precedents described in Part II, but it does the best job reconciling the competing interests involved in these cases. Balancing tests invariably involve some degree of indeterminacy, but not necessarily more than intentbased inquiries. The hard truth is that no bright-line rule will effectively address the concern with dominant parties adopting election laws that disadvantage their competitors. Any standard, whether focused on intent or effects, will be dependent on the evidence adduced in discovery and at trial, making it inherently difficult to predict the outcome in advance. That is as it should be. A balancing test that considers the disparate impact on voters favoring non-dominant parties will address this concern while taking into account the legitimate competing interests that voting cases implicate. This is not to deny that other group associations may also be relevant under the Anderson-Burdick balancing standard. Of these, the most salient is race. That is partly because of the country's long and ugly history of racial exclusion, exemplified by the NAACP cases from which the right of association emerged. 143 While not formally a political party, the NAACP functioned like one in some respects, challenging the firm grip on power held by the dominant faction, the all-white Democratic Party. The exclusion of voters based on their race or ethnicity is not solely of historical concern. As Professor Charles has documented, race remains central to political identity today. 144 And minority voters, especially African Americans and Latinos, but also Asian Americans, lean strongly Democratic. 145 The Democratic voting preferences of most racial minorities provide a strong incentive for Republicans, when they control the levers of power, to improve their own electoral preferences by enacting laws that disproportionately exclude these groups. It is difficult-and practically meaningless-to ask whether race or party predominates where there is a high correlation between the two. 146 Elected officials of one party may very well be pursuing partisan ends by excluding minority voters who consistently support the other. While this phenomenon may seem most likely when Republicans are in power, it is at least conceivable that Democrats might also engage in such exclusion with respect to minority sub-groups that lean Republican. 147 Either way, the racially disparate impact of the law is relevant because it is closely related to its partisan effects.
On this point, I suggest a different emphasis than Professor Charles, the author of the most comprehensive analysis of the relationship between voting and associational rights to date. While Professor Charles emphasized racial identity as a basis for association, 148 I view parties as central because they are the primary associations through which we organize politically. This is not to deny that racially focused association groups (like the NAACP) are critical at certain places and times and may play a role very similar to parties. Nor is it to deny the possibility that the dominant racial group within a political party might try to diminish the clout of a minority racial group with the same party, warranting judicial intervention. But we no longer live in a world where racial minorities are excluded from political parties. The racial impact of a law is germane to its partisan intent and effect. In places with a high degree of racial polarization, the two are likely to be highly correlated. But the primary unit of analysis under the voting-association doctrine upon which this Article is focused should be party.
How would this play out in practice? The basic framework would be the same one that lower courts have applied since Crawford, requiring that the "character and magnitude" of the voting restriction be weighed against the "precise interest" proffered by the State. Courts would still consider the "magnitude" of the burden, including the number of voters affected and the degree to which each affected individual is burdened. The main difference would be an explicit recognition that a central component of the "character" of the burden is the impact on members of a non-dominant political party. For a voting rule adopted by Republicans, courts would look at its negative effect on Democratic voters; for a rule adopted by Democrats, courts would look at its negative effect on Republicans. 149 This question has He specifically mentioned several First Amendment cases burdening voters on the basis of party association including Anderson, suggesting a "pragmatic or functional assessment that accords some latitude to states." 156 Commentary on Justice Kennedy's suggestion has mostly been critical, questioning whether partisan motivations can ever be excised completely from redistricting. 157 But Justice Kennedy's Vieth concurrence need not-and I think should not-be understood as requiring that redistricting be entirely free from partisan considerations any more than the Anderson line of cases requires that voting rules be entirely free from partisan considerations. He is better understood as suggesting that future partisan gerrymandering claimants focus on how great a burden the challenged plan imposes on the opposition, weighing that burden against the State's proffered interests. Applying the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing standard in the manner I have suggested here-with a special eye on the character and magnitude of the burden on non-dominant parties-might be the best approach to gerrymandering claims as well as barriers to the right to vote as such.
V. CONCLUSION
For almost a half-century, the Supreme Court has recognized the link between the First Amendment right to expressive association and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. In the Anderson line of cases, it transformed this recognition into a manageable doctrine, requiring courts to balance the burdens imposed by the challenged practice against the State's asserted interests. At the heart of this inquiry is the extent to which the challenged rule has a disproportionate effect on non-dominant political parties and independent candidates. Crawford imported Anderson's standard into the realm of election administration, without expressly recognizing its connection to the First Amendment right of association. The cost of losing the voting-association connection is to obscure the central question whether the challenged voting practice advantages the dominant party by impeding participation by those likely to support its main rival. The time has come to restore the severed link between the constitutional rights of voting and association. Doing so would not radi-
